

Phil 108, February 4, 2014

The Life-Saving Analogy:

- If I could save a life *directly* at \$X cost to me, it would be wrong not to do so. (E.g., Shallow Pond.)
- By giving \$X to an aid agency, I could *indirectly* save a life.
- Therefore, by analogy, it is wrong not to give \$X to the aid agency.

Iterating the Life-Saving Analogy:

- If I could save *another* life directly at \$X, it would be wrong not to do so. (Compare: If I passed by another shallow pond,...) What I have *already done* is no defense.
- Therefore, by analogy, it is wrong not to give *another* \$X to the aid agency to save *another* life indirectly.
- And so on. This leads to...

The Severe Demand: I am morally required to keep contributing to aid agencies increments of time and money *each of which is large enough to save a life*, until either:

- (a) there are no longer any lives to be saved by those agencies, or
- (b) contributing another increment would itself be a large enough sacrifice to excuse my refusing to save a person's life directly at that cost.

Objection:

- It is false that whether or not *anyone* lives or dies depends on whether or not I give \$X to an aid agency. OXFAM's operations are simply not sensitive to any individual's contribution.
- So it is false that by giving \$X I would save another life indirectly.
- So, if I am morally required to give money to OXFAM, it is for a different reason.
- Namely, we, *collectively*, are morally required to work together, through OXFAM, to save lives.
- The question is what fairness requires me, *individually*, to contribute to this *collective* obligation.

Cullity's criticism of Murphy:

First, beneficence is *not always* a cooperative aim. Giving to aid agencies is a cooperative aim. But saving the child in Shallow Pond is not. This is what Two Potential Saviors variant reveals.

Second, the *Fair Share View* (=Compliance Condition) is not convincing. *Winch Case:* If one of the three of us refuses to help, does this mean that the other two of us are not required to take up the slack? No: the two of us are now collectively required to turn the winch. Fairness requires that each of us does his share of this *new* collective requirement. Iteration leads to the...

Extreme Demand: I am morally required to keep contributing my time and money to aid agencies until either:

- (a) there are no longer any lives to be saved by those agencies, or
- (b) contributing my share of the cost of our collectively saving one further life would be a large enough sacrifice to excuse my refusing to contribute.

Objection: "The Extreme Demand isn't as demanding as the Severe Demand, because the sacrifice that fairness requires me to make toward the collective effort to save lives is smaller than the sacrifice that I am required to make to save a life myself."

Reply: Ask yourself this question: "Does fairness require me to contribute another penny to the collective effort to save lives?" Even on a *very* lenient view of what fairness requires, it requires you to contribute at least a *penny*, unless you are *very* badly off. So you are required to keep giving pennies until you are so badly off. Surprisingly, the Extreme Demand is *more* demanding than the Severe Demand. This is because, in most cases, another penny probably would not save another life.

What leads to the Extreme Demand is the:

Iterative approach, which asks: When is the cost of the *next* contribution excessive?

To avoid the Extreme Demand, we need instead the:

Aggregative approach, which asks: When is the cost of what I *have contributed up until now* excessive?

The argument for the iterative approach: The only factors relevant to whether I should give another increment toward helping another person are what will happen to *him* and *to me*. What I have contributed up until now is not relevant.

Is there an argument *against* the iterative approach and the Extreme Demand and for the *aggregative* approach?

Cullity's argument:

(1) The Extreme Demand implies that it is wrong of you not to lead *an altruistically focused life*: a life that constricts your pursuit of your own friendships and personal projects as much as you bearably and usefully can for the purpose of contributing to helping others.

(2) When your interest in having (or doing) a certain thing is an interest in having (or doing) what it would be wrong for you to have (or do), that interest cannot be a good reason for morally requiring me, as a matter of beneficence, to help you to get (or do) it.

- This does *not* mean that I cannot be morally required to help people who will do wrong. The point is that their *interest* in wrongdoing cannot be what morally requires me to help them.
- *Intuitive support*: the gangster's interest in being a gangster is not a reason to help him unjam his gun.
- *Argument*: Your interests in what is wrong do not provide you with reason that it is morally acceptable for you to act on. So how can they provide someone else with reason that it is morally acceptable for them to act on? So how can they morally require someone else to promote them?

(3) Therefore, the Extreme Demand implies that your interest in a non-altruistically focused life cannot morally require me, as a matter of beneficence, to help you.

(4) But your interest in a non-altruistically focused life *can* morally require me, as a matter of beneficence, to help you!

(5) Therefore, the Extreme Demand is false. And so the iterative approach is mistaken. What I have done up until now *is* a relevant, countervailing consideration, rooted in the structure of beneficence itself.

Objection: "(4) is just an intuition! We already knew that the Extreme Demand conflicts with intuitions!"

Reply: It is one thing to say that we are morally required to do *more* than we intuitively think. It is quite another to say that we are morally required to do *less*.

A limit specific to beneficence: Cullity's argument explains why the demands of *beneficence* are limited. But it does not imply that *other* demands of morality, such as prohibitions on harming people or requirements to keep promises, are limited.

Review Questions:

1. Why, according to Cullity, does the Extreme Demand imply that holding the door open for an artist lugging her painting to the gallery is like informing a brutal dictator about the location of dissidents? What does he think this shows about the Extreme Demand?
2. Unger would grant that the Extreme Demand conflicts with *some* intuitions: for example, it conflicts with our intuition that our behavior in Envelope is not wrong. Cullity argues that the Extreme Demand conflicts with *other* intuitions. What does Cullity think is different about these intuitions, and why does he think that they present a more serious challenge to the Extreme Demand?