Phil
290: Reasons and Rationality
Mondays,
2–4, in 234 Moses Hall
Niko
Kolodny, kolodny@berkeley.edu
Office
hours: Wednesdays, 2–4 in 144 Moses Hall, or by appointment.
Description:
You
seem to be subject to two different kinds of ÒoughtÓ: two different kinds of
normative demand. On the one hand,
you are subject to demands that the world makes on you. Some fact of your situation, we might
say, is a reason for you to
believe or do something. Because
the hunter was caught red handed, you have reason to believe that he was
poaching. Because Moses Hall is on
fire, you have reason to leave. On
the other hand, you are subject to demands that your attitudes make on one another,
however the world may be. Some
attitude that you have, we might say, makes it irrational of you to have or fail to have some other attitude,
whether or not you have reason for or against any of those attitudes. Because you believe that Berkeley is
west of San Francisco, it would be irrational of you to believe that Berkeley
is east of San Francisco. Because
you intend to vote for Nader, it would be irrational of you to fail to intend
to go to the polling station. The
topic of this seminar is the relation between these two kinds normative demand.
Requirements:
August
28
Introduction
***
No class September 4 ***
September
11: Presenter: Titelbaum
Broome,
ÒNormative
RequirementsÓ
Broome, ÒReasonsÓ
September
18: Presenter: Hunter
Bratman,
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, Ch. 2, 3, 8
September
25: Presenter: Schmall
Smith,
The Moral Problem, Ch. 5 (Part1, Part 2)
October
2: Presenter: Beeghly
Korsgaard, ÒThe Normativity of
Instrumental ReasonÓ
October
9: Presenter: Wallace
Wallace,
ÒNormativity, Commitment,
and Instrumental ReasonÓ --- Please "browse" to the article (2001). The direct link takes you to a distorted PDF.
Searle,
Rationality in Action,
pp. 263–266
October
16: Presenter: Kolodny
Kolodny,
ÒWhy
Be Rational?Ó
October
23: Presenter: Kohl
Raz,
ÒThe Myth of
Instrumental ReasonÓ
October
30: Presenter: Kolodny
Broome, ÒIs Rationality Normative?Ó
Kolodny, ÒWhy Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Ó
November 6: Presenter: Kolodny
***
Outlines of term papers due ***
Kolodny, ÒWhy Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Ó
November 13: Presenter: Kolodny
Kolodny,
November 20: Presenter: MacFarlane
MacFarlane,
ÒHow is Logic Normative for Thought?Ó
November
27: Presenter: Ginsborg
Ginsborg, ÒReasons for BeliefÓ
December
4: Presenter: Kolodny
***
Term papers due ***
Kolodny, ÒWhy Have Consistent and Closed Beliefs, or, for that Matter, Probabilistically Coherent Credences?Ó