What is to be said for democracy? Not that it gives people what they want. Not that it realizes a kind of autonomy or self-government. Not that it provides people with the opportunity for valuable activities of civic engagement. Not, at least not in the first instance, that it avoids insulting them. Or so I argued in Part I.¹

At the end of that paper, I suggested that the justification of democracy rests instead on the fact that democracy is a particularly important constituent of a society in which people are related to one another as social equals, as opposed to social inferiors or superiors. The concern for democracy is rooted in a concern not to have anyone else above—or, for that matter, below—one. In this paper, I try to explicate what relations of social equality are, in a way that shows them to be something that we, with reason, care about. Then I try to explain why and in what sense democracy is a particularly important constituent of a society marked by such relations. I

don’t expect readers to find this account especially inventive or surprising. The aim is instead to come to terms with something that lies more or less in plain view, something that we are prone to look past, in the search for a more involved, hidden explanation.

While this justification of democracy might help to reconcile us to our own ideals, it might seem, at first, detached from any live controversy. After all, our political culture has more or less settled that, whether or not we do live in a democracy, we are supposed to. However, even if it is not a live controversy whether to live in a democracy, it remains a live controversy, debated almost without cease, what kind of democracy to live in. What sort of electoral system should we have? Should we allow money to influence political outcomes? From left, right, and center, we hear pleas to count this or that institution as more or less “democratic” than some alternative, in a sense about which we are supposed to care. The practical point of asking what justifies democracy is to know when such pleas should be taken seriously. Accordingly, the latter sections of this paper ask to what extent this justification of democracy, rooted in relations of social equality, constrains what sort of democracy we should have.

The answer has two sides, roughly speaking. On the one hand, when it comes to formal structures, social equality constrains deflationingly little. It may be perfectly compatible with anti-majoritarian structures, as well as with persistent minorities, at least in the abstract. Viewed in this light, claims that, say, the “filibuster” or a “winner-take-all” system is, in itself, undemocratic are misleading. They elevate to the level of first principles what are really contingent, instrumental questions. On the other hand, when it comes to informal conditions, social equality constrains almost impossibly much. This is because social equality draws no clear line between disparities of formal voting power and disparities of information or indirect influence. Equality of such informal influence may be practically unattainable, at least at any
tolerable cost. So certain “democratic deficits” may be with us to stay. I close by arguing, however, that the aspiration to equality of informal influence is at least not, as some have argued, conceptually confused.

1. Preliminaries: Democratic decision-making

In Part I, I assumed, as a more or less stipulative starting point, that a political decision is democratically made when it is made by a process that gives everyone subject to it either equal—or both equal and positive—formal, or both formal and informal—opportunity for informed influence either over it or over decisions that delegate the making of it.

This initial formulation leaves two choices open, which we might hope that a justification of democracy would help us to settle. A more permissive, “equal” conception requires only equal, but not necessarily positive, opportunity. It treats lotteries as no less “democratic” than voting. By contrast, a “positive” conception requires both equal and positive opportunity.

A more permissive, “formal” conception requires equality (or equality and some positive measure) of only formal opportunity. Suppose that the relevant procedure is voting. Then formal equality requires, first, no unequal legal or structural barriers to acquiring relevant information or rationally influencing others’ votes or the decisions of delegates. This would be violated, for example, by “viewpoint” restrictions on political speech or unequal restrictions on political association. Second, it requires universal (adult) suffrage. This would be violated by property qualifications for the franchise, or a poll tax, or other prerequisites for voting that are unequally difficult or costly for some to meet. These include Jim Crow literacy tests or contemporary voter ID requirements. Finally, it requires equally weighted votes. This would be violated by John
Stuart Mill’s plural voting scheme, which gave at least one vote to each citizen, but additional votes to those whose occupation or education indicated superior intelligence.²

A less permissive, “informal” conception would require equality of informal opportunity as well.³ Informal opportunity consists roughly the availability of resources, such as wealth and leisure, to apply to the legal or procedural structure to acquire information or influence the votes of others (or the decisions of delegates).

2. Preliminaries: Justifying democracy

To “justify democracy” would be to answer the following questions:

1. Institutions: Why should we want, or establish, or maintain democratic institutions? Why do we, in general, have reason to try, over the long run, to make political decisions democratically?

2. Authority: Why does the fact that a political decision was made democratically contribute, pro tanto, to my being morally required, as an official or citizen of the relevant polity, to implement or comply with it?

3. Legitimacy: Why does the fact that a political decision was made democratically contribute, pro tanto, to its being permissible to implement it, even despite its treating me, as a citizen of the relevant polity, in distinctively “political” ways that, at least in

² John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Ch. 8.
other contexts, are objectionable: such as using force against me, threatening to use force against me, or coercing me?

It is a further question how these claims weigh against countervailing reasons: for example, whether others will be, all things considered, morally permitted to implement a given political decision, despite how it treats me, or whether I am, all things considered, morally required to implement it myself. While such questions—essentially, questions about the limits to democracy—need answers, they lie beyond the scope of the present paper.

3. Preliminaries: The instrumental argument for democracy

To be sure, a large part of the justification of democracy is simply instrumental. For a variety of reasons, something like the following seems plausible:

*Reliability Thesis*: As things actually are, or could reasonably be expected to be, some democratic procedure of decision-making is *more substantively reliable* than any non-democratic procedure. That is, there is some democratic procedure such that if people, in general, try, over the long run, to follow it, then the substantive good will be better served than if they were to try to follow any non-democratic procedure.

By the “substantive good,” I mean, roughly, a just distribution of cooperatively produced means, such as liberty and wealth, to pursue one’s individual plan of life, excluding from the list of such means (if they are such means) opportunities for influence over political decisions. One interpretation of the substantive good might thus be Rawls’s social primary goods, less the political liberties, distributed according to his two principles.

However, this instrumental argument seems incomplete in two ways. First, even if unlikely (and clichéd), we can imagine that the will of a benevolent dictator was, or the calculations of a bureau of technocrats were, more substantively reliable. Nevertheless, there
seems to be a familiar “democratic” objection to such procedures. A common reply is that such procedures are ruled out by an *Equality Constraint*, which says, roughly, that if a procedure gives anyone a say, it should give everyone an equal say. But what explains the Equality Constraint? Not the substantive good, it would seem. For precisely what the Equality Constraint is supposed to constrain is what unfettered pursuit of the substantive good would recommend.

Second, suppose that the Reliability Thesis is true. Even so, why does it follow from the fact that it will have good effects if people, in general, try, over the long run, to follow some democratic procedure, that any particular decision that might issue from that procedure is authoritative (i.e. morally binding) or legitimate (i.e. permissible to implement)? Suppose someone could bring about substantively better results by disregarding the democratic decision. What reason does she have against this? The Reliability Thesis may answer Institutions: whether to establish and sustain democratic institutions in general and over the long run. But it is less clear how it answers Legitimacy or Authority, which have to do with the normative standing of particular decisions that issue from those institutions. Call this the *Bridging Problem*.

4. *Social inequality*

My thesis, in brief, is that the value of relations of social equality supports an Equality Constraint and a solution to the Bridging Problem. But what are relations of social equality?

Here it may help to start negatively: with what relations of social equality are not. I take it that we intuitively grasp the notion of relations of social superiority and inferiority: that, in virtue of how a society is structured, some people can be—in a sense that is perfectly familiar, even if its analysis is elusive—“above” and others “below.” We know the paradigms. The servant is “subordinate” to the lord of the manor, the slave “subordinate” to the master, and so on. If asked to place various social groups in a hierarchy, we do this with ease. The plebian is
“lower than” the patrician, the untouchable “lower than” the Brahmin, and so on. We know what Alexis de Tocqueville found so conspicuously absent when he wrote of being struck by the “equality of conditions” (among white men) of Jacksonian America. We know how to follow the subtle negotiations among different “stations” that preoccupy so many European novels well into the 20th century. Social inequality—the presence of social inferiority and superiority—is what social scientists would describe as “stratification,” or what might otherwise be described as “distinctions in rank or status,” “hierarchy,” “subordination.” To some extent, it is the analogue—irrevocably transformed by symbol and self-consciousness—of “pecking order” in other social animals. This analogy may help to explain the primitive depth and inarticulateness of our consciousness about relations of social superiority and inferiority. And I take it that whereas human beings are instinctively conscious of relations of social inferiority and superiority, we, at least here and now, are not simply conscious of these relations, but are moreover disquieted by them, see them as a problem. The paradigms provoke in us a sense of unease.

But what in these paradigms provokes this unease? What are relations of social superiority and inferiority, exactly? The main negative point is that it is not simply a matter of how stuff is allocated. More carefully put, relations of social superiority and inferiority do not obtain just when some have more, or better, cooperatively produced means, like liberty and wealth, to pursue their individual plans of life. When, in optimistic moods, I imagine that posterity will have much greater wealth than I have, no question of social superiority or inferiority makes sense. I am not in any recognizable way “subordinate” to my great-grandchildren.

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Nor is there social inequality *just when* such disparities are accompanied, and perhaps produced, by a *failure of equal concern for people's independent claims to means*. By an “independent” claim, I mean simply a claim not rooted in a concern about social superiority or inferiority itself, such as a claim based on need or contribution.

On the one hand, this still is not a sufficient condition of social inequality. Suppose that, in a state of nature, several people collaborate in producing some means. Then some of them run off with an unfair share of the fruits of their labors, never to encounter the others again. There is a disparity of means (snared rabbits, say) and a disparity that results from a failure of equal concern for people’s independent claims to them (given equal contributions, the rabbits should have been split equally). Nevertheless, because the thieves and their victims do not continue to live together, because the disparity is not, as it were, woven into the fabric of ongoing social relations, there is no structure of hierarchy or subordination between them.

On the other hand, failure of equal concern for claims to independent means is not even a necessary condition of social equality. Perhaps, some form of “left-libertarianism” (roughly, the view that each person has absolute property rights in himself, but shares equally with others property rights in the world) or “luck egalitarianism” (roughly, the view that goods should be distributed so that people enjoy equal welfare or resources except for differences that result from their own choices) represents the correct answer to the question, “How should we respond with equal concern to independent claims for means—or at least material means?” To my mind, left-libertarianism and luck egalitarianism seem about as plausible answers to that question as any. Nevertheless, a society scrupulously governed by such a view—and so a society that responds with equal concern for independent claims—might be a society with significant social inequality. The cumulative effect of prudent or imprudent decisions, propensities for saving, and so on, in
such a society would predictably be class stratification, distinctions in status, personal
dependence, and so on. This descriptive point suggests, in turn, a normative point: that, while
some form of left-libertarianism or luck egalitarianism may be the appropriate way to distribute
means among people who are for a time thrown together, but will go on to live apart, it is not, at
least not without amendment, an appropriate way of distributing means among people who have
to share a social world.

These points have become almost a mainstay in discussions of justice in the distribution
of economic goods, due to the work of Elizabeth Anderson, Samuel Scheffler, Debra Satz,
Jonathan Wolff, and others—work to which I am deeply indebted. For the moment, I am
concerned primarily with the descriptive point. A distribution of material goods governed only
by an abstract conception of fairness in the allocation of goods—or, as I have put it, by equal
concern for people’s independent claims to them—will differ from a distribution governed
instead by the aim of maintaining relations of social equality among those to whom the goods are
allocated, or among them and those responsible for the allocation.

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Nor is it even enough to avoid social inequality to distribute means not simply with equal concern for independent claims, *but also with an eye to avoiding the kinds of social inequality that might arise from that very distribution*: for example, regulating even fair disparities of wealth so as to avoid class stratification or personal dependence. Imagine a society administered by class of ascetic warriors, selected at an early age, by a battery of aptitude tests, to make laws for the laypeople and to regulate justice among them. Imagine that they scrupulously distribute means in the way just described. Of course, by hypothesis, they have greater means of certain kinds: such as the opportunity to perform their administrative role. However, suppose that, by way of compensation, they deprive themselves of many personal liberties and material comforts that civilians enjoy. Arguably—to the extent the worth of various means are commensurable at all—they are not even advantaged, on balance, in the distribution of overall means. Yet there is an obvious sense in which they constitute a superior social stratum, occupy a higher position in the hierarchy. This is surely one of the first things that would register on a visitor to their shores.  

So what is present in the societies that we have described—societies in which there is equal concern for independent claims to means—that might account for the intuitive presence of social inequality? It seems to have to do with:

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6 This imaginary society should be reminiscent of Philip Pettit’s paradigms of beneficent “domination”: the kindly slave-master, the husband who keeps his wife in a “gilded cage,” the aristocrat with a pronounced sense of noblesse oblige, the colonial administrator who tirelessly bears the “white man’s burden,” and so on. See Philip Pettit, *Republicanism* (Oxford: 1999) and *On the People’s Terms*; and Henry S. Richardson, *Democratic Authority: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy* (Oxford: 2002), ch. 3. However, as I argue in “Being Under the Power of Others,” ms., I think it is a mistake to put this objection in terms of domination, as Pettit defines it.
some having greater relative power (whether formal or legal, or otherwise) over others, while not being resolutely disposed to refrain from exercising that greater power as something to which those others are entitled;

some having greater relative de facto authority (whether formal or legal, or otherwise) over others, in the sense that their commands or requests are generally, if not exceptionlessly, complied with (although not necessarily for any moral reasons), while not being resolutely disposed to refrain from exercising that greater authority as something to which those others are entitled; and

some having attributes (e.g., race, lineage, wealth, perceived divine favor) that generally attract greater consideration than the corresponding attributes of others.

A comment about (i) and (ii), followed by a comment about (iii). The brute fact that the stronger Beefy could physically subdue Reedy need not imply his social superiority over Reedy, if Beefy

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7 The definition and measurement of such power is, unsurprisingly, a difficult philosophical problem in its own right. See, for example, Alvin Goldman, “Toward a Theory of Social Power,” Philosophical Studies 23 (1972): 221–268. For present purposes, we just rely on the intuitive judgments on which an explicit theory of such power would be based.

8 This selects what I think are the essential features of the analyses of social inequality given by Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” and The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: 2010), Ch. 5; Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?” “Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2005): 5–28; and “The Practice of Equality” in C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, and I. Wallimann-Helmer, ed., Social Equality: Essays on What it Means to be Equals (Oxford: forthcoming); and Pierre Rosanvallon, The Society of Equals, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Harvard: 2013). I say “selects,” because I worry that many elements of Anderson’s analysis confuse social inequality with distinct concerns. Some of these elements are not necessary for social inequality: such as “exploitation,” “marginalization,” unjustified “violence” (“What is the Point of Equality?” 313), judgments of superior “intrinsic worth,” “natural” or unchosen distinctions, such as “family membership, inherited social status, race, ethnicity, gender, or genes,” and a denial that “all competent adults are equally moral agents” (312). And some of these elements seem straightforwardly objectionable on grounds that have nothing to do with social inequality. Unjustified violence, for example, is possible even among people who do not share a society. And it is objectionable simply because it does not respect people’s independent claims to be free from such violence, which is a means to just about any sane plan of life.
is resolutely disposed to refrain from exercising this greater power over Reedy, not as an optional
gift, but as something to which Reedy is independently entitled. In other words, social equality
does not require equality of “raw” or “natural” power: power, such as strength, speed, cunning,
knowledge, viewed in abstraction from human dispositions. Nor can equality of “natural” power
be realized by institutional design, for institutions, such as legal systems, themselves consist in
human dispositions. What social equality requires is that “natural” power be regulated by the
right dispositions. This is what the “while” clauses in (i) and (ii) aim to capture. Thus, for
example, the mere presence of standing armies need not imply a disparity of power of this kind
over political decisions, if (a big “if,” in many times and places) they resolutely respect
democratic civilian control.9

The comment about (iii) is that the responses constitutive of “consideration” are not just
any positive responses to a person or his attributes. By “consideration” I mean to pick out,
specifically, those responses that social superiors, as social superiors, characteristically attract.
Viewed from another direction, “consideration” is meant to pick out those responses that, in a
society like ours, which is anxious about social inequality, we feel, either every person is owed
equally simply in virtue of being a person, or are problematic for anyone to give anyone else.
Examples are responses such as respect and intimidation. In our society, everyone, we feel,
should be given equal respect, and no one should feel intimidated. Similar things might be said
about certain forms of attention, deference, courtesy, a willingness to serve the interests of or to
fulfill the claims or commands of, efforts to ingratiate or curry favor with, and so on.

By contrast, merely acknowledging someone’s special talent or beauty, or feeling love or
friendship toward someone, need not be consideration. One can acknowledge such attributes, or

9 I am particularly indebted to Victor Tadros for discussion of these issues.
love someone, without granting to someone the sort of deference characteristic of the lowly’s relation to the high. After all, buyers in a slave market can acknowledge special talent or beauty in their prospective purchases. And even living in a society that at least aspires to equality, we do not think that everyone is owed such acknowledgement simply in virtue of being a person. While politeness might require paying some minimum of attention and regard to each fellow guest at a dinner party whoever he or she may be, it does not require that one find them all equally physically attractive or skilled at conversation, much less that one love them as one does one’s spouse or children.  

A deeper analysis of the difference between consideration and the broader category of positive response is elusive. However, we can identify some necessary, although not jointly sufficient, characteristics of consideration. First, although their basis may be some narrow and accidental attribute of the person, the responses constitutive of consideration are focused on the person and their interests, claims, or imperatives as a whole. Thus, because Herr Geldsack has high net worth, one is particularly courteous to him and solicitous of his wishes. By contrast, we can rate a sprinter highly along the dimension of speed, say, without this bleeding into our responses toward him or his claims as a whole. Second, these responses are practical, matters of how someone deals with the person and claims of the target. They are not simply judgments of the kind that an uninvolved spectator would make. By contrast, acknowledging that Genghis

10 This is not to deny that people reasonably care about being rated highly for attributes such as talent or beauty. They are an important source of self-esteem. Nor is it to deny that the distribution of such sources of self-esteem is a concern of political morality. Nor, finally, is it to deny that such attributes could be the basis for the sorts of responses distinctive of social inequality. Beauty, for example, could play the role that birth plays in more familiar aristocratic societies. In that case, a beautiful person would attract not only high ratings for their beauty, but also greater courtesy, deference, etc. toward their person, interests, claims, and imperatives as a whole. The point is simply that this involves a further step. The mere acknowledgement of personal beauty need not be so freighted.
Khan was a fine horseman is not itself a practical judgment, but instead an observation open to 21st-century students of military history to make. Finally, the responses constitutive of consideration are “agent-neutral” in character. If the fact that X is higher born than Y calls on Z to give greater consideration to X than to Y (perhaps where Z is Y), then it calls on everyone else to do the same. By contrast, friendship and love are agent-relative in character. The fact that X is my friend calls for me to give greater weight to X’s interests than Y does not mean that it calls for others, such as Y’s friends, to do the same.

Since these are, to repeat, not sufficient conditions, more remains to be said. However, our purposes may not require a deeper analysis of the difference between consideration and other kinds of positive response. While such an analysis would be essential to a freestanding account of what social inequality is, such an analysis need not be essential to the argument that a concern for social equality implies a concern for democracy. Even setting aside the (iii) consideration component of social inequality, the (i) power and (ii) de facto authority components of social inequality may suffice for that argument. (A similar reply can be given to the reservation, which some may have, that, while disparities in power and de facto authority may be problematic, disparities in consideration as such are not.)

In any event, this account of social inequality is only a first approximation. I do not mean to suggest that social inequality, at least of any objectionable kind, arises whenever there are inequalities in power, authority, and consideration. As we will see shortly, other factors, involving voluntariness and the finality of authority, also come into play. Nor is this to say what, if anything, unequal opportunity for influence over political decisions might have to do with social inequality. This preliminary account simply tells us where to look: not at who has what,
but instead at who enjoys power or authority over, or greater consideration in comparison with, whom.

Nevertheless, this first approximation suffices to explain some observations made earlier. First, it explains why a failure of equal concern for independent claims is not necessary for social inequality. Since those with greater power and authority may nonetheless exercise it in accord with equal concern for independent claims to means, there can be disparities of power and authority even though there is equal concern for independent claims to means. Such was the case with our ascetic warriors. And while giving weight to someone’s independent claims to means is one response constitutive of consideration, there are other responses constitutive of consideration: such as deference and intimidation. So there can be disparities of consideration even when there is equal concern for independent claims to means.

Second, this preliminary account explains why a failure of equal concern for independent claims to means is not sufficient for social inequality. No matter how unfair the resulting disparities in means, the absconding collaborators at least raise no question of social inferiority or superiority. Since there is no further interaction between them, the theft does not produce any disparity in power or authority over their victims. And it cannot result in any disparity of consideration. In order for there to be disparity in consideration, there needs to be a common judge, who gives greater consideration to the social superior and less to the inferior. But the absconders and their victims live too far apart to come under the same appraising eye.

5. **Social inequality: Not instrumental, or expressive, or a special case**

So much, for the moment, for what relations of social inequality are. I argue—or, rather, I propose for consideration, since it isn’t the sort of claim that admits of much articulate argument—that we have reason to avoid relations of social superiority and inferiority for their
own sake, not simply as a symbol of, or means to, something else. Simply to restate the thought, and not to give it a deeper explanation, one might say that relations of social inferiority and superiority are inappropriate among moral equals: that is, beings owed and bearing the full range of moral rights and duties. To put the thought positively: insofar as we are to have ongoing social relations with other moral equals, we have reason to relate to them as social equals: that is, in a way that deliberately avoids whatever asymmetries in power, authority, and consideration would constitute relations of social superiority and inferiority, motivated by a concern to avoid such relations for its own sake.

As I say, this isn’t the sort of claim that admits of much articulate argument. What argument there is is abductive. That is, we begin with an intuitively felt concern about certain paradigms—such as the kindly master—and then argue that it is best interpreted as a concern about relations of social superiority and inferiority. To some extent, we have already done this. We argued that the concern isn’t, or isn’t just, a concern about a failure of equal concern for independent claims. Part of the work is done elsewhere, where I argue the concern is better interpreted as a concern about relations of social superiority and inferiority than about “domination.” And, here, we can address a few other rival explanations.

Is our concern to avoid social inequality, for instance, merely instrumental? Well, to what end? It might be suggested that social inequality gives rise to vices of superiority (e.g., haughtiness) and inferiority (e.g., obsequiousness). But the claim that these are vices seems to presuppose that social inequality is a bad thing. Or it might be suggested that perceiving oneself as socially inferior has debilitating effects on one’s psychology, which in turn prevents one from

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successfully pursuing one’s plan of life. But this presupposes that we have a prior and independent concern about social inferiority. Otherwise, our perceiving ourselves to be socially inferior would not make us prey to debilitation in the first place. And if it is to be presupposed that we have a prior and independent concern about social inferiority, then why not take that concern seriously in its own terms?

Is our concern to avoid social inequality merely symbolic? But what does social inequality express? A failure of equal concern for independent claims to means? But if social inequality need not be accompanied by a failure of such equal concern, then why should it express it? Does social inequality express a belief in the moral superiority, or superiority in decision-making, of the socially superior? But inequalities of power need not be accompanied by any such beliefs. They might be simply a matter of brute force. Neither must inequalities in authority and consideration be accompanied by any such beliefs. Consideration-constituting responses such as deference and courtesy, for example, may simply be the by-product of self-interested behavior, or altruistic temporizing. It may be something as evaluatively unfreighted as marketing one’s services to those with greater purchasing power, or paying greater attention to the declarations of those likely to be followed, in an effort to coordinate one’s actions to do as much good as one can. There need not be any belief that those who attract greater consideration

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12 A similar thought occurs in Rawls’s account of the parties’ reasoning in the original position. They are to care about the “social bases of self-respect,” because without them one will not be motivated to pursue one’s conception of the good. Rawls includes among the social bases of self-respect the components of social equality: most notably, the political liberties, which are central to the status of equal citizenship. See note 20. However, the social bases of self-respect also include other elements, which could be achieved without social equality: such as having one’s talents appreciated (Theory of Justice, §67) and not being sacrificed for the benefit of others already better off (§29).

13 I suspect it may be appealing to invoke only the effects of a belief in the value of social equality, because it seems to avoid any controversial, positive commitment to the value itself. But there is something unstable in the attempt to avoid an allegedly controversial value by assuming that, as a matter of psychological fact, everyone accepts it.
somehow merit it for their virtue or wisdom. Does social inequality express a disregard for the inappropriateness of social inequality? Undoubtedly, but this answer doesn’t compete with ours, but rather depends on it.

Is our concern to avoid social inequality merely a special case of a more general concern that our social roles be acknowledged and affirmed? This is a more promising suggestion. Imagine Hierarcadia, a chivalric paradise,\textsuperscript{14} in which people are attached to their social roles, even though these roles constitutively depend on social inequality. Their attachment to them doesn’t stem from false consciousness, or ignorance of the alternatives. As even we can see, their social roles provide them with meaning, orientation, and the possibility of a fulfilling life. Moreover, relations among members of the society, while socially unequal, are nonetheless what we might call “role-respectful”: everyone relates to everyone else in a way that acknowledges and affirms the value that each person takes his own role to have. The value that those on the lower rungs take their stations to have is a value that is manifestly affirmed in how those higher up relate to them. The servant who finds his own worth in being his liege’s loyal and dependent retainer is acknowledged and affirmed as such in his liege’s relations with him.

Ought the Hierarcadians to avoid relations of social inequality, presumably by refashioning their social order? It is hard to be confident that they ought. What then explains why they lack the reasons to avoid social inequality that we have? The explanation, it may seem, is the suggestion under review. The concern for relations of social equality is only a special case of a more basic concern: namely, that everyone else acknowledge and affirm the value that one takes one’s own social role to have. In our society, everyone values his or her role as a social

\textsuperscript{14} I borrow the phrase “chivalric paradise” from a letter sent to me by Joseph Raz, summarizing comments from him and his students.
equal. In Hierarcadia, by contrast, everyone values his or her role in the hierarchy. This is why relations of social inequality are bads in our social context, but not in Hierarcadia.

I do not think that we can accept this explanation, however, because it fails to account for a crucial asymmetry. Suppose doubts set in about the value of social roles in Hierarcadia, and those lower down claim to be treated as equals. Their claims would have a weight that the claims of their superiors to continue to be treated as superiors would lack. Yet if at root everyone’s claims were the same—that others acknowledge and affirm the value that one takes one’s own social role to have—then everyone’s claims would be on a par.

So I find myself drawn to another explanation. While relations of social inequality are still bads in Hierarcadia, and while they provide the Hierarcadians with reasons to avoid them, these reasons are outweighed or “excluded” by the Hierarcadians’ attachments to their social order. Here we might view social inequality in a way similar to how some view (putative) disabilities, such as deafness. Just as, on this view, deafness is a bad wherever it occurs, we might say that social inequality is also a bad wherever it occurs. However, just as there are distinctive goods that are possible only within deaf communities (e.g., personal relationships, modes of expression, senses of humor), so too there are distinctive goods possible only within a social unequal order like Hierarcadia (e.g., social roles and role-respectful relations). Should Hierarcadia become egalitarian, a bad would be eliminated, but genuine goods would also be lost. Attachments to such distinctive goods, formed by life within such communities, may provide members not only with overriding reasons against seeking to ameliorate the bads on which the goods constitutively depend, but also with exclusionary reasons against even ambivalence: against seeing such bads as bads at all. Their attachments give them compelling
reasons, if not to believe a falsehood, then at least not to give thought to a truth: that disability or social inequality is, in itself, something to be regretted.\textsuperscript{15}

6. Why are political decisions special for social equality?

Suppose, then, that—whether from sincere conviction or only from a polite gameness—the reader grants a concern for social equality. The question is then why equal opportunity to influence political decisions should be a particularly important component of social equality.\textsuperscript{16}

The start of the answer is easy: To enjoy influence over a decision that has power and de facto authority over others is itself a kind of power and de facto authority over others. Moreover, it is constitutively a form of consideration, insofar as others are disposed to comply with one’s proposals, and being so disposed is itself a consideration-constituting response. And it can be expected to bring in its train other such responses, and so other forms of consideration. The obvious problem, though, is that the same can be said of any number of non-political decisions: say in churches and universities. Yet we don’t seem as troubled by inequalities of influence over those decisions.\textsuperscript{17} To be sure, the point should not be overstated. We are troubled by

\textsuperscript{15} To be clear, I don’t claim that this view of deafness is correct. Deafness may simply be a difference, not a bad. I claim only that this view is coherent, which is all that the analogy requires.

\textsuperscript{16} The idea that a concern for social equality implies a concern for democracy is often suggested in the literature. See, in particular, Elizabeth Anderson “Democracy: Instrumental vs. Non-Instrumental Value,” in in John Christman and Thomas Christiano, ed., \textit{Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy} (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 229–243. It remains somewhat unclear to me, however, how Anderson thinks the implication runs. She appeals to a number of different values. Some of these don’t seem to require democracy (in our sense): such as counting others’ interests and claims equally and expressing that one so counts them. Other of these values (though they may be otherwise appealing) have little directly to do with social equality: positive self-government, participation, discussion, experimentation.

inequalities of influence over many non-political decisions, especially in relationships whose value constitutively depends on a certain degree of equal standing. Such relationships include friendship and loving marriage or partnership, at least as these are understood in our place and time. But, all the same, we are not troubled in the same way in many other non-political contexts.

One might reply that even those inequalities of influence are objectionable as such, but that we tolerate these departures from the egalitarian default, because the objections are outweighed by other values. Some inequality in decision-making is the tragic price of efficiency. Or some inequality in decision-making may be constitutive of certain social forms that we find valuable in themselves. But this reply puts the justification of political democracy in jeopardy, or at any rate does not explain what needs to be explained: why we aren’t as troubled by inequalities of influence over the decisions of non-political associations. For on the assumption that some alternative procedure of political decision-making, such as Mill’s plural voting scheme, would be substantively better, we have compelling reason to depart from the egalitarian default there too. So why not be just as tolerant of departures from the default in the political case? For this reason, we need to see whether we can identify certain special features of the political: if not unique to the political, at least not shared by those non-political associations whose inequality does not trouble us in the same way.

Returning to the paradigms that provoke anxiety about social inequality, we can observe, first, that one way of avoiding, or at least moderating, what would otherwise be a relation of social inferiority is being able to escape it at will. If one can exit a slave “contract” at will, either because, as one knows, one can void it at will, or because it is already void (that is, will not be enforced by third parties), then it is not clear in what sense one really is a slave. More generally,
what seems to matter for relations of social inferiority and superiority is not so much equality in actual power, authority, and consideration, but instead equality of opportunity for power, authority, and consideration, where equality of opportunity is understood not as equal ex ante chances, but instead ongoing freedom (both formal and informal) to exit relations of inequality.\textsuperscript{18}

As far as standing with others as an equal is concerned, opportunity, rather than the exercise of opportunity, is what matters. The point isn’t that while non-political social inferiority is always a burden, one forfeits one’s complaint when the burden is self-imposed. It is rather that the freer one is to exit what would otherwise be a relation of social inferiority, the less it seems a relation of social inferiority in the first place.

However, one typically cannot escape the effects of political decisions at will, or at least not without high cost or difficulty. By contrast, escaping subjection to the decisions of non-political associations (at least in non-slaveholding or non-feudal societies) can be freer. Of course, it need not be freer.\textsuperscript{19} But, in that case, worries about social inequality in those non-political relations intuitively don’t seem out of place. This isn’t an objection to the account, but rather an implication of it: that disparities of power in employment, or in the family, may be as threatening to social equality as disparities of political power when, like political power, they cannot be voluntarily escaped.

\textsuperscript{18} As Anderson stresses, a concern for social equality does not support a “starting-gate” theory (“What is the Point of Equality?” 308–9), but instead requires access “at all times” (289). This point may, however, be in tension with her suggestion that the objection to hierarchy is answered by the “fair opportunity principle” (The Imperative of Integration, p. 107).

\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, the freedom to exit any particular relation of subordination to any particular superior may not suffice for what matters for social equality: a freedom to exit all such relations. It might be like the relation between the proletarian and the capitalist class depicted by Marx. Or it might be like the relation between women and men, in a society where each woman has the right to divorce her current husband, but is expected to be subservient wife of some husband.
To illustrate a second way of avoiding, or at least moderating, what would otherwise be a relation of social inferiority, suppose that lord and servant set terms at the start of each year, somehow with genuinely equal influence, over how the lord is to boss the servant around. Of course, this may make the labels “lord” and “servant” less applicable, but that’s the point. In such a case, the fact that they have equal influence (with one another and with whoever else might have such influence) over decisions higher up, as it were, the chain of command, which set the terms for how other, lower-order, decisions are to be made, plays a role in avoiding, or moderating, the social inferiority that unequal influence over those decisions would otherwise entail. To be sure, equal influence over setting the terms may not be a sufficient condition for such avoidance or moderation. Perhaps the lower-order inequality must have a justification based in equal concern for independent claims. Or perhaps it must not shore up, or be predicated on, relations of social inferiority (such as between men and women) elsewhere. The suggestion is just that equal influence over setting the terms is one necessary condition for such moderation or avoidance, absent standing freedom of exit. Without that—if the lord continues to set the terms for how he himself bosses the servant around, without ceding any influence to the servant, and if the servant has no escape—then it is hard to see how the servant can have equal standing in their relations.

Now, this moderating maneuver may be possible with non-political decisions. But it isn’t going to be possible with political decisions. This is because political decisions, characteristically, issue commands that are claimed to be and are generally (if not exceptionlessly) treated as overriding or nullifying any other decision. That is, they have final de facto authority.
There are really two points here. The first is simply that the fact that the threat to social equality posed by unequal influence over political decision-making cannot be moderated in this way, since there is no higher court of appeal, makes equal influence over political decision-making particularly important. It becomes our only option.

The second point is that if we do have equal influence over political decisions, and those decisions have final authority over non-political decisions, then that itself contributes to moderating the threat of social inequality posed by unequal influence over non-political decisions. Thus, the fact that we don’t see those decisions as striking against our social equality is not surprising. The threat to social equality that hierarchy would otherwise pose, one might say, is moderated by the fact that whatever hierarchy there may be is ultimately regulated or authorized from a standpoint of equality. This is closely related to a point made by Rawls and Joshua Cohen in defense of the priority of basic liberties. The common status as “equal citizens” that equal basic liberties provide makes the other inequalities, not simply in income and wealth, but also in positions of authority and responsibility, more tolerable than they would otherwise be.\(^\text{20}\)

Finally, although there are many kinds of power that one person can have over another, the power to subject another to physical force—to literally “push another around”—is especially important to relations of social superiority and inferiority. Perhaps force is special because it is the primitive starting-point in thinking of relations of interpersonal power: the sort of thing that even a child (or, in its way, a pecked chicken) can understand. Or perhaps force is special

\(^{20}\) As Rawls notes, equal basic political liberties are particularly central to this status: “When the principle of participation is satisfied, all have the common status of equal citizen” (*Theory of Justice*, p. 227). In a sense, this paper is an attempt to come to terms with the chord struck by this remark. See also Joshua Cohen, “The Natural Goodness of Humanity,” in Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine Korsgaard, ed., *Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 102–139, at 120–121.
because it preempts rational persuasion, and so relates to the target as a brute or thing, a relation of superiority if ever there was one. I suspect, though, that force is special because, as a contingent matter, the power to use force is the “final” power, in a sense analogous to the “final” authority just discussed: the power that usually determines the distribution of other powers. In the normal run of human affairs, one cannot reliably have superior powers of other kinds over others where they have superior powers to subject one to force. For example, one cannot have the power to withhold certain goods from them, since, if need be, they will take those goods by force.

If asymmetries in the capacity to use force are distinctively important for social equality, then asymmetries in influence over political decisions will be important to social equality in a way that asymmetries in influence over non-political decisions are not. For whereas non-political decisions do involve certain kinds of power, political decisions characteristically involve force, for example, through commands ultimately backed by threats of force.21

21 I don’t claim that it is necessary and sufficient for a decision’s being political that it cannot be escaped at will and involves either force or final de facto authority. Some decisions count as political, or at least properly subject to democratic decision-making, even though they neither use force or coercion, nor issue commands. Consider decisions to alter the physical environment irrevocably, or make use of state property, or do or say things “in the name of the community.” Such decisions, one might say, dispose of what all hold in common, of what is, in some sense, the joint property of every member of the community, even if they do not involve force or coercion, or command. (Conversely, decisions that involve force or coercion, or command need not only, or perhaps at all, dispose of what is held in common. Take a decision that merely commands certain patterns of human action and forbearance. These patterns of action and forbearance are not like the natural environment, or state assets, or the reputation of the community. My actions may be part of the patterns, and the body by which I perform my actions may belong to me exclusively. But it is not as though each of us somehow jointly owns the pattern consisting in the actions performed by everyone else.)

If there are decisions that dispose of what is held in common, then there seems to be a fairly immediate explanation of why there should be equal opportunity for influence over them, which may need no recourse to considerations of social equality. Once it is established, by whatever argument, that these things really are ours, that they are our joint property, then that would seem already to entail that how they are disposed of should be in some way sensitive to
7. *Equal opportunity for influence over political decisions as a component of social equality*

The thesis, then, is that it is a particularly important component of relations of social equality among individuals that they enjoy equal opportunity for influence over the political decisions to which they are subject.\(^{22}\) However, two parts of this claim—“particularly important component” and “equal opportunity for influence”—bear some clarification.

Equal opportunity for influence is a “particularly important component” in the sense, first, that it is necessary for full or ideal social equality. That is, where equal opportunity to influence political decisions is absent, there is at least some failure to achieve the ideal. Second, in a wide range of (although not necessarily all) non-ideal circumstances—in which the addition of equal opportunity to influence political decisions cannot realize full social equality, because of other asymmetries in power, authority, and consideration—the addition of equal opportunity to influence political decisions nevertheless brings us closer to full social equality. And finally, as we saw above, equal opportunity to influence political decisions plays an important structural

\[\text{our choices (whether or not our choices serve our substantive interests). And if these things are}
\text{equally our property, then how they are disposed of should be equally sensitive to our choices.}
\text{In evaluating the claim that equal influence over political decisions is a particularly important}
\text{component of social equality, one should not be misled by artifacts of salience. If members of a}
\text{university department all give one another an equal voice on department affairs, a fair share of}
\text{the collective benefits and burdens, and mutual regard and esteem, the suggestion that those of}
\text{them who are not citizens of the state in which the university is located are somehow}
\text{“subordinate” to those who are may not seem very plausible. (In part, this may simply be}
\text{because the non-citizens on the faculty are non-citizens voluntarily and retain rights of}
\text{citizenship in their home country. Things might already be different if they were refugees denied}
\text{any path to citizenship in the new country or any right of return to the old.) But now suppose}
\text{that during a period of nationalist hysteria, a referendum is proposed to jail or deport foreign}
\text{intellectuals. The citizens on the faculty vigorously oppose it, and refuse to let it affect}
\text{departmental governance, much less their face-to-face interactions. But now the mere fact that}
\text{they share in an asymmetry of power over political decisions, decisions to which the non-citizens}
\text{will be subject, generally becomes more salient, and it does raise a question of subordination.}
\text{But, then, this asymmetry of power, and so question of subordination it raised, was present all}
\text{along. The deportation proposal simply made it visible.}

26
role in moderating the threat that other asymmetries would otherwise present to social equality, insofar as it ensures that whatever hierarchy there is is regulated from a standpoint of equality.

This is not to argue, by any means, that equality of opportunity for influence is sufficient for full social equality. It is easy to imagine any number of political decisions that, in their content, would strike against social equality, even if arrived at with equal opportunity for influence. To take the extreme, there might be a unanimous referendum to establish a hierarchical society. (This may be an important source of limits to democratic legitimacy and authority, although again such limits lie outside the bounds of this paper.) Nor is it to deny that in some non-ideal circumstances, striving for equal opportunity to influence political decisions may actually take us further away from full social equality. For example, giving greater opportunity to influence political decisions to members of groups whose acceptance as social equals is under threat in other domains, especially as a kind of temporary or remedial measure, may be warranted.

What is “equal opportunity to influence” political decisions? Note, first, that it is matter of influence, not correspondence. One enjoys influence to the extent that the decision is reached by a process that is positively sensitive to one’s choice or judgment, such as by a fair vote. By contrast, one enjoys correspondence with a political decision just when the decision is the one that matches one’s choice or judgment. So long as one enjoys equal influence, whether or not one enjoys correspondence does not, in itself, bear on one’s standing as a social equal.

Second, what matters is one’s equal relative influence with others, not the absolute extent of one’s influence. The fact that one does not have influence over the decision is not a matter of concern for social equality, so long as no one else has influence over it either. A decision made by no one does not represent the superior power or authority or any individual over any other.
Third, what matters is opportunity for influence, not the exercise of this opportunity. If I have the same opportunity as you have to influence a decision, but choose not to take it, then there is no hierarchy or subordination between us, at least with respect to the making of that decision. Among other things, this means that non-participation in itself has no bearing on one’s standing as a social equal.

Fourth, what matters is, specifically, equality of opportunity for informed influence. Suppose an asymmetry in influence over a decision would threaten social inequality between us. It scarcely defuses the threat that while both of us can, in a suitably objective sense, influence the decision, I know how to influence it in accord with my judgments, but you do not: your attempts at influence are, from your perspective, more or less random. To take an extreme case, a disparity of knowledge of this kind could be what makes you my slave; I know the code that unlocks your chains, whereas you can only enter numbers at random. The point is not that giving you as much information as I have will lead us to make a better decision—although it may well do that too. The point is that instead that, whether or not it leads to a better decision, it helps to remedy the imbalance in power between us.

Finally, what matters is, equal opportunity not only for informed influence, but also for autonomous influence: influence knowingly in accord with judgments that are themselves reached by free reflection on what one takes to be relevant reasons. It scarcely defuses the threat of social equality if I can manipulate the judgments that underlie your vote.

8. An Equality Constraint and an Answer to Institutions

How, then, do we ensure equal opportunity for informed, autonomous, influence over political decisions among people who do have ongoing social relations?
One possibility, in principle, would be anarchism: that no political decisions are made at all. Perhaps we can imagine a state of nature where no one has final de facto authority over anyone. It is harder to imagine a state of nature where no one is exposed to force or coercion (say, in the form of deterrent threats of self-defense). But if all were suitably symmetrically situated and independent, then perhaps no one would be exposed to the superior capacity for force or coercion of any other individual (which means, among other things, that no one ever joins forces with another to expose a third party to force or coercion over which he has no influence). It is hard to see why there would be relations of social inferiority and superiority under such conditions, at least with respect to the making of political decisions. So there is no argument, here, that social equality requires the state, only, as we will see, that it is compatible with the state.

Let us, however, make the entirely safe, factual assumption that more substantial political decisions will be made. Then one possibility, already broached in passing, is to ensure that no individual has any opportunity for influence over those decisions.

To some extent this is realized by the “rule of law,” which is often tellingly contrasted with the rule of men.\footnote{This is an important current in Arthur Ripstein, \textit{Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy} (Harvard: 2009). A distinction between “offices” and “persons” is often invoked in a similar spirit. See Anderson, \textit{The Imperative of Integration}, p. 106.} To the extent that the greater power, authority, and consideration (the “majesty” of the law) really do reside in the law, and not in any individual, none of us is ruled by any other one of us. Indeed, I suspect that this is the source of much of the appeal of the ideal of the rule of law: not simply its regularity or predictability, but also its impersonality.

The difficulty is that the rule of law, on its own, is insufficient. The laws themselves must come from somewhere. And if the laws come from only some of us, then the rule of law
will seem merely like a particularly efficient and self-disciplined way of subordinating the rest of us. The rule of law, one might say, realizes the rule of those, if any, with the power to determine what the law is, to the extent that they have the power to determine it.\(^{24}\)

In principle, laws, or political decisions more generally, might be made by someone, but not by someone with whom any of us, who is subject to the decision, has ongoing social relations. In that case, that person’s greater opportunity to influence decisions would not threaten social equality. At first glance, though, it may be obscure how this could occur. Rule by a colonial power won’t fit the bill, since only the narrowest conception of “social relations” would deny that there are social relations between colony and imperial center.

However, if one looks across time, rather than space, then the phenomenon comes to seem pervasive. To a great extent, the accumulated body of law to which we are subject was made by those no longer living. In this way, we are subject to political decisions of the dead. Now, perhaps we have the sort of ongoing social relations with the dead that make our social equality with them an object of concern. But perhaps not. Perhaps their relation to us is like the relation of the absconding rabbit hunters to their victimized colleagues, or like posterity’s relation to me. On this view, Thomas Jefferson’s suggestion,\(^{25}\) in his letter to James Madison of September 6, 1789,\(^{26}\) that every generation should draw up its own constitution, on the grounds that “‘the Earth belongs in usufruct to the living’; that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it” would be not simply unworkable in practice (as the more reliably earthbound Madison

\(^{24}\) However, this means the rule of law has a crucial role to play in ensuring social equality. Social equality is not achieved if, while our opportunity to influence the making of the “law” is equal, we are ruled by something other than this law that we make.

\(^{25}\) A suggestion sympathetically explored by Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism Without Inequality (Oxford: 2003), Ch. 7.

\(^{26}\) Available at: http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl81.php.
tactfully observed in his reply of February 4, 1790\textsuperscript{27}) but also wrongheaded even as a matter of theory.

The basic point is this. If our concern were for correspondence, or some kind of absolute influence, then Jefferson’s proposal would be the obvious ideal. By contrast, if our concern is social equality, then perhaps there is no objection to rule by the “dead hand of the past”: where all are committed to following whatever law may have been bequeathed to us, just as we might all be committed to following whatever law a majority of us chose. At least it’s an open question. And if there is no such objection, then this may be one respect in which human mortality is not entirely to be regretted. It gives us intelligent decision-making without the threat of social hierarchy.\textsuperscript{28}

The difficulty, of course, is that this inheritance, as rich as it may be, is neither perfectly prescient, nor perfectly self-interpreting. Decisions may be substantively poor, and conflicting

\textsuperscript{27} Available at: http://www.constitution.org/jm/17900204_tj.txt.

\textsuperscript{28} If we accept that rule by the dead is compatible with social equality, why not also rule by God, or—for that matter—rule by substantive correctness? Why can’t a cleric say to dissenters: “Listen, I don’t make the rules, I just read them out, and then obey just like you. We’re all equals under Him. Take your complaint to the Guy upstairs.” And why can’t the philosopher king likewise say: “Listen, I didn’t invent the Form of Justice. We’re all equals under It. Take up your complaint with the Order of Things.” As with rule by the dead, these procedures may well be substantively problematic, because of limited foresight and conflicts of interpretation. But do they threaten social equality?

It depends on what these procedures come to. Consider “rule by substantive correctness.” On one variant, this might amount to a following a specified code, whose interpretation leaves little room for judgment, which, as it happens, reliably arrives at the correct answer. This would indeed give everyone equal opportunity for autonomous influence, by giving them none at all. On another variant, however, this might amount to relying on the judgment, or interpretation, of some sage, who, as it happens, reliably arrives at the correct answer. This would not give everyone equal opportunity; it would give the sage greater opportunity than others to influence the decision in line with his autonomous judgment. Moreover, the substantive good typically radically underdetermines the choice of policy. So, even if the sage were consulting the Forms themselves, with eyes seasoned to the glare, he would find much left to his discretion.
interpretations may lead to coordination failures, with ensuing substantive losses. New decisions will need to be made, and old decisions will have to be disambiguated.

This can be done without giving any of us any opportunity for influence, such as by lottery, or it can be done by giving each of us some positive, but equal, opportunity for influence, such as by voting. The concern for social equality thus functions as an Equality Constraint, which is satisfied by equal democratic decision-making, as well as by positive democratic decision-making.

Needless to say, this doesn’t rule out other arguments, which appeal to something other than social equality, for positive procedures over merely equal procedures. One argument is simply instrumental: namely, to appeal to the

*Constrained Reliability Thesis*: As things actually are, or could reasonably be expected to be, some positive procedures that satisfy the Equality Constraint are more substantively reliable than any non-positive procedures that satisfy the Equality Constraint.

This strategy of argument for positive democracy, which combines the Equality Constraint with the Constrained Reliability Thesis, has a distinguished pedigree, to which I am indebted.29

One might suggest that there are also non-instrumental reasons for positive democracy. Perhaps, to take a possibility briefly explored in Part I, it is valuable, in itself, for a collective to make political decisions on the basis of reasoned deliberation, and we have interests in participating in this activity. Or perhaps we have other interests served by opportunity for positive influence over political decisions. Indeed, perhaps the mutual recognition of such interests is even a constitutive part of relations of social equality. The present account does not

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rule out these possibilities. However, on grounds explored in Part I, I am pessimistic that we can identify interests of the right kind. Moreover, the instrumental case for positive democracy better coheres with certain intuitions than a non-instrumental case, which argues for positive procedures even when merely equal procedures are substantively more reliable. For instance, there is the intuition that, when it comes to deciding who is to be drafted, a fair lottery is better than a vote. A lottery fully satisfies the substantive claims of each—namely, that he should have an equal chance of avoiding the draft—whereas a vote only introduces the possibility of substantive unfairness (for example, that voters gang up on a salient or disliked candidate). If we accept that the argument for positive procedures in general is purely instrumental, then we can explain why, in this case, in which positive procedures are less substantively reliable, merely equal procedures are intuitively preferable. By contrast, if we insist that there is a non-instrumental argument for positive procedures, that some important value of “self-governance” always argues in favor of a vote, then we need to explain why, in this and all similar cases, that value is overridden in favor of a lottery.

Even if we leave unresolved whether there is a non-instrumental case for positive democracy, we still have an answer to Institutions. We should see to it that people follow democratic decision-making procedures, on grounds of social equality, with the choice between equal or positive procedures being settled on other grounds, principally perhaps grounds of substantive reliability.

9. *A Solution to the Bridging Problem and Answers to Legitimacy and Authority*

Recall that to answer the question of Institutions is not immediately to answer the questions of Legitimacy or Authority, in part because of the Bridging Problem. Suppose, to take the case of Authority, I face a choice on some particular occasion of implementing either the democratic
decision or a substantively superior decision. If the only reason for implementing the democratic decision was that, over the long run, everyone’s doing so would produce the substantively best results, then we would face the familiar paradox of rule utilitarianism.

But, on the present account, there is another reason. If I were to disregard the democratic decision, then I would be depriving others of equal opportunity to influence this very decision.\(^{30}\) For influence over the decision, in the sense relevant in this context, is not simply influence over what gets engraved on tablets or printed in registers; it is influence over what is actually done. Insofar as relations of social equality are partly constituted by precisely that equal opportunity for influence, I would be, by depriving others of that equal influence, relating to them as a social superior, at least in that instance.\(^{31}\) If others have a claim on me to avoid relations of social superiority, then they have at least that claim on me to implement the democratic decision.

\(^{30}\) This account of democratic authority is similar in structure to, and owes much to, Thomas Christiano, *Constitution of Equality* (Oxford, 2008), Ch. 6; Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination* (Oxford, 2004), Ch. 5; Scott Shapiro, “Authority,” in Jules Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma, and Scott Shapiro, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 382–439. It differs chiefly in the interests, or values, cited to explain why individuals should have equal opportunity to influence political decisions. In both structure and content, it is very close to, and has benefitted from, Daniel Viehoff, “Political Equality and Democratic Authority,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (forthcoming).

Viehoff appears to view relational equality as requiring us to refrain from considering facts about superior power in our deliberations. By contrast, I see it as requiring us to refrain from exercising that superior power except in ways that others have had equal opportunity to influence. One concern about the former view is brought out by the following sort of case. Suppose a frail husband, Mr. Equal-Igual, cannot open his bottle of life-sustaining pills. His wife, Ms. Equal-Igual, who has aged better, still has the strength to open it. Mr. asks, “Dear, it’s time for my pill. Would you please open the bottle?” If Ms. may not consider the differential in strength (in effect, a power of life or death) in deliberating how to reply, how is she to reply? As she would if there were no differential in strength: “Open it yourself, you great lazy thing! You can do it just as well as I!”? It seems fine for Ms. to consider her superior strength; it’s what she’s prepared to do with it that matters.

\(^{31}\) Some may object that I would not relate to others as a social superior in refusing to implement a decision that others are implementing, provided that I believe that anyone else may refuse as I do. If I have greater influence than others, this is only due to their voluntary choice. But this
Similar reasoning might help to explain Legitimacy. Here it is worth distinguishing two general challenges to the permissibility of political treatment: force, coercion, and suchlike. On the one hand, one might grant that when a decision is sufficiently substantively good, that is a positive reason to implement it sufficient to overcome my objection to how it treats me. But when a decision has substantive defects, what positive reason remains to overcome my objection? To this challenge, the answer is that if the decision was democratically made, then that is a positive reason that at least countervails against, even if it does not ultimately prevail over, my objection. This is, in a way, just the flip side of Authority. If I, as agent, have positive reason to implement even substantively defective decisions, then so do others. And their reasons weigh against my objections as patient.

On the other hand, the challenge to the permissibility of political treatment may be not that there is a deficit of positive reasons to implement the decision, but instead that my objection throws up a barrier against such treatment, which is more or less insensitive to those positive reasons. Indeed, it is a common view, perhaps the dominant view, in political philosophy that even the fact that the decision is substantively ideal is not enough to make it legitimate. There is, according to this view, some Further Objection to political subjection as such, even to substantively ideal decisions. This Further Objection can be met only by some Further Condition, such as that I consented to it—as philosophical anarchists argue—or that I could accept it on the basis of some restricted set of reasons—as Rawlsians argue.

For all the insistence on a Further Condition, however, it is elusive what Further Objection it is supposed to answer. When clearly stated, many of the candidates for this Further objection requires that anyone’s refusal would have influence comparable to my refusal. This is unlikely where there is any significant division of labor in the implementation of the decision.
Objection seem weightless or confused. If a residual worry remains, as I argue elsewhere, it is that in being subjected to political decisions, we are somehow subordinated to other people: namely, those who make the decisions. In other words, the residual worry is, once again, about standing in relations of social inferiority in virtue of the distribution of influence over political decisions. But if that is the worry, then it is most directly answered not by consent or acceptability, but instead by avoiding such relations of social inferiority. If I have equal opportunity with every other individual to influence political decisions, then the mere fact that I am subjected to those decisions does not subordinate me to any other individual. Thus, the fact that the decision is democratic might not only supply a positive reason that weighs against my objection to any substantive defects it may have. It might also remove whatever Further Objection might be said to remain to political subjection as such, even to substantively ideal decisions.

10. Which democracy? Representation

What justifies democracy, we have suggested, is that democracy is a particularly important constituent of a society in which people are related to one another as social equals, as opposed to social inferiors or superiors. Yet our definition of “democracy” is very broad, covering a wide variety of political forms. It remains to be seen to what extent, and in which ways, this justification of democracy constrains what sort of democracy we should have.

At first, one might assume that social equality requires, implausibly and unworkably, democracy of a radically direct form. Even in an ideal representative democracy, most laws are not made through referenda, by individuals with equal influence over those laws, but instead through legislation, by elected representatives with greater influence over those laws than other

32 “Justifying the State,” ms.
individuals. Worse, even legislation by plebiscite would not ensure equal influence over every political decision, assuming that the laws passed delegate to certain people (e.g., peace officers), but not others, the making of certain subsidiary decisions.

However, in ordinary, non-political contexts, if a person, or group, as “principal,” delegates to another person, as “agent,” certain powers (e.g., to make certain decisions, to bargain on behalf of the principal’s aims) this need not imply the social inferiority of the individual principal (or the members of the group principal) to the agent. Examples of such agents are lawyers, doctors, accountants, and financial planners. Moreover, this extends to political contexts as well. As just observed, legislatures regularly delegate decisions to subsidiary officers or bodies (among other things, by passing laws that do so). Again, no question of the social inferiority of the legislature, or its members, to the delegate arises in these cases. Indeed, if anyone, the agent is the social inferior (although, assuming that her occupancy of the office is voluntary, then she is not, in fact, qua official and, in any event, she is not a social inferior qua citizen).

The suggestion, then, is that the relationship between the citizenry and official—say, representative in the legislature—might be one of such delegation. If so, then the electorate, or individual constituents belonging to it, need not be socially inferior to the representative. The representative can be, qua representative, a “public servant,” in the full sense of the phrase. No doubt, many of our actual representatives only pay lip service to the idea that they are public servants. But, at least at first glance, that seems a failing of reality to live up to the democratic ideal, not necessarily a failing of the democratic ideal itself.
The difficult question, which is left as a task for other work, is what conditions such delegation must meet. Among these conditions might be: (i) that the agent exercises powers that, as the agent accepts, belong to the principal, (ii) that the agent is answerable to the principal for that exercise, (iii) that the agent exercises those powers on behalf of the principal’s interests and claims, (iv) the agent exercises those powers with direction from the principal’s expressed will, (v) the agent is, or can be, replaced after a short, limited term, and (vi) the principal controls the selection of the agent. There might also be less demanding conditions. For example, as an alternative to (v), it might be acceptable that the agent has a longer or indefinite term without possibility of replacement, or, as an alternative to (vi), it might be acceptable that the agent is chosen by a delegate of the principal, or not chosen by anyone, but selected by lot.

It is natural to expect that the conditions that the delegation of powers must meet in order to be compatible with social equality will be more stringent to the extent that the powers in question are themselves more threatening to social equality. In particular, the conditions on the delegation of powers to make decisions that issue commands will be more stringent than powers merely to make decisions that apply those commands to particular cases or execute them. Likewise, the conditions on the delegation of powers to make decisions that issue commands higher up the chain of authority will be more stringent than powers merely to make decisions that issue commands lower down the chain. Return to the cases of investment management or legal representation. The conditions on the delegation of powers to decide which assets to purchase, or which motion to file, will be more demanding than those on the delegation of powers to

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33 For a recent discussion, see Eric Beerbohm, *In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy* (Princeton: 2012), ch. 8.
34 If legislators need to meet only this alternative condition, rather than condition (vi), then the lottocracy described by Alex Guerrero, “Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (forthcoming), might be an acceptable form.
execute the purchase order, or to deliver the motion to the court. While principals typically
directly decide who the former delegate will be, they typically have no direct control over who
the latter delegate is.

This implies that the conditions on delegation of powers to make laws, for example, will
be more stringent than those on delegation of powers to apply or execute the laws. This accords
with the intuition that, on the one hand, legislators must be directly elected with short, fixed
terms, whereas, on the other hand, certain judges and executive officers (e.g., central bankers)
may be appointed by elected officials for longer or indefinite terms.

This accommodation of representative democracy is silent on two matters. First, it says
nothing about the size of the representative body. If there is, in general, no social inequality in a
group’s being related as principal to a single person related as agent, then there need be no social
inequality in a representative legislature consisting of a single official. Of course, there may be
other objections to a single-member legislature, such as doubts about its substantive reliability.

Second, it says nothing, directly, about who may be a representative. If we accept that
representatives are not, as such, socially superior to their constituents, then it is not immediately
obvious why someone who is denied the chance to serve as a representative, but retains equal
influence over who the representative will be, is thereby threatened with social inferiority.
Indeed, the objection to being denied the chance to serve as a representative may be, in the first
instance, just that one of one’s independent claims to means has not been equally met. One
important category of means to a fulfilling life are chances to pursue worthwhile careers. And
just as being someone’s doctor, lawyer, or broker can be a worthwhile career, so too can being
his political representative. Of course, this failure to meet someone’s independent claim to
means may in turn amount to an asymmetry of consideration, in which the claims of some are
weighted more highly than the claims of others. As such, it might then be part of a broader charge of social inequality. For example, suppose women, while not denied the vote, were categorically excluded from serving as representatives. They would not only be deprived of their fair share of means, but also of equal consideration, which is one of our incidents of social inequality. But the first objection—that they have been deprived of their fair share of means—can be pressed without saying anything about social equality. And this objection has nothing in particular to do with serving as a political representative. It would apply with just as much force if women were categorically denied the opportunity to pursue a career in medicine or law.

11. Which Democracy? Equal a priori chances of decisiveness and majoritarianism

What does equal opportunity for influence, understood as a component of social equality, require of formal procedures? These formal procedures govern both the “electoral system”—the casting and counting of ballots in elections and referenda—and “parliamentary procedure”—how representatives, if any, reach final decisions.

At this point, it will help to distinguish three different forms of influence. First, one is decisive when, had one’s choice or judgment been different, the decision would have been different. For example, under majority rule, one is decisive when and only when there is a tie or one is a member of a majority that wins by a single vote. Second, one has control over the outcome to the extent that one’s judgment or choice would be decisive over a wide range of changes in relevant conditions, including, especially, the choices and judgments of others. “Wide,” as vague as it is, will serve our purposes. An effective dictator, for example, has control over the outcome. Now, it might seem that one has influence only when one is decisive. But this hardly seems a conceptual truth. There is, third, also a notion of contributory influence, which might be understood on a model of applying a vector of force, which combines with other
vectors to determine a result. The result is sensitive to this vector of force, and the vector remains the same in its “magnitude” and “direction,” no matter what other vectors are supplied. Images of placing equal weights on scales, or applying equal tension to a rope in a game of tug of war, suggest themselves.

For reasons that will become clearer, equal opportunity for influence, of the kind relevant to social equality, is best interpreted as equal opportunity for contributory influence. How should equal opportunity for contributory influence be measured? My view is that by X-ing I exercise equal contributory influence over a decision just when my X-ing has equal a priori chances of being decisive over the decision: that is, has equal chances of being decisive on the assumption that no pattern of X-ing by others is more likely than any other pattern. If, as it were, the weights are equally heavy, then everyone should have the same chance of tipping the scales, assuming that no placement of other weights is more likely than any other placement.

The point, I stress, is that formal procedures should realize equal a priori chances of decisiveness as the natural measure of equal contributory influence. I am not suggesting that voting rules should realize a priori chances of decisiveness because what most fundamentally matters to each individual is equal actual decisiveness. That suggestion would invite the reply: “If what matters is equal decisiveness, then why should anyone care about equal chances of decisiveness under the utterly artificial and unrealistic assumption that no pattern of votes is more likely than any other? What we should seek to realize is equal actual decisiveness: that, given how everyone actually votes, either everyone is decisive or no one is.”

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Of course, one might argue on independent grounds that equal actual decisiveness is what we should seek to realize: that it represents a better interpretation of equal opportunity for influence than equal opportunity for contributory influence. It might seem to be somehow more realistic, more attentive to the facts on the ground.

In one way, however, this alternative interpretation makes no difference. As things are, electoral systems that realize equal a priori chances also realize equal actual decisiveness, because they almost never leave anyone decisive. Steven Lee expresses a common, but mistaken, view in writing:

Under “one person, one vote,” individuals who are constantly in the voting minority do indeed have an equality of potential influence, in the sense that, independent of knowledge of the constellation of interests among voters, they would be seen as as likely to cast the deciding vote as anyone else. But, given the particular constellation of interests among voters that results in certain individuals being constantly in the voting minority, the actual influence of those individuals is clearly not equal.36

On the contrary: under “one person, one vote,” what Lee calls “actual influence”—what I call “actual decisiveness”—is almost always equally zero. One person’s vote almost never makes a difference, whether she is in the minority or the majority. It is true that the satisfaction of interests in correspondence, if there are any, will be unequal. Those in the majority will have those interests satisfied, while those in the minority will not. And it is likely that the satisfaction of substantive interests will also be unequal. But those are different questions.

In another way, however, the interpretation makes a difference, for the worse. Many systems that realize equal actual decisiveness do not realize equal a priori chances. With selective disenfranchisement, or with plural voting, in which some have additional votes, no one is almost ever decisive either. For example, even if the schooled were to have two votes to the unschooled’s one, it would still almost always be the case that no one, schooled or unschooled, was ever decisive, since it is almost as rare for vote tallies to differ by one or two votes as it is for them to differ by only one. So, according to the actual decisiveness interpretation, equal opportunity for influence would still be realized, counterintuitively, in these cases. This is one reason for favoring the a priori interpretation.

There is another reason why equal actual decisiveness seems untenable as an interpretation of equal opportunity for influence exercised by voting. It violates the:

*Compossibility Principle*: Equal opportunity for X-ing should not be understood in such a way that whether equal opportunity for X-ing obtains among individuals depends on how any of those individuals exercises the opportunity to X.

For example, a rule permitting everyone, including the guy with a megaphone, to speak at the same time may be said to give everyone equal opportunity to speak at that time, but not equal opportunity to be heard. For if Mr. Megaphone exercises his opportunity to be heard, no one else will have that opportunity. Suppose, turning to the case of voting, that there are two more “Yeas” than “Nays” under plurality rule. Equal actual decisiveness is achieved in this case, because no one is decisive. However, if one “Yea” had abstained, then equal actual decisiveness would not have been achieved, since the “Yeas,” but not the “Nays,” would have been decisive. So interpreting equal opportunity for influence as equal actual decisiveness would violate the Compossibility Principle.
Equal a priori chances for decisiveness—in the sense of each person being decisive in the same number of possible “profiles” of votes (assuming a finite number)—does not imply “neutrality” among decisions—that for any two decisions, each is produced by the same number of profiles of votes. So it does not rule out supermajority requirements, against the common view that political equality somehow demands majority rule. Supermajoritarian requirements give everyone equal a priori chances at decisiveness, but are not neutral. Fewer profiles produce a change than reproduce the status quo.

However, it is often said that such rules are incompatible with political equality. Thus, Peter Jones writes: “To allow the will of the minority to prevail would be to give greater weight to the vote of each member of the minority than to the vote of each member of the majority, thus violating political equality.”

But why should this be? Doesn’t everybody’s vote have equal weight under a supermajority rule? Even with supermajority requirements, for any given decision, every person has the same opportunity to influence the adoption of that decision as has any other person—even if the (equally enjoyed) opportunity to influence the adoption of that decision is greater or less than the (equally enjoyed) opportunity to influence the adoption of some other decision. Such a rule gives people equal opportunity to influence to decisions even though it is not neutral among decisions. Presumably, what matters for social equality, which is equality among people, is that people have equal opportunity to influence decisions, not that decisions have equal opportunity of being made.

Jones’s thought must be: “Such a rule does not give people equal opportunity for influence. For, holding fixed the decisions that people favor, the rule gives some people greater

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opportunity to influence the adoption of the decision that they favor than it will give others to influence the adoption of the decision that they favor.”

There are, however, two reasons to resist this reply. First, when we consider, for the purposes of a broadly liberal political morality, how to meet people’s equal claims, it seems appropriate to view them as free: as not bound by, or identified with, any particular choice, judgment, or outlook. So conceived, there are no grounds for saying that the rule treats them differently. A well-known debate between Rawls and Thomas Nagel provides an analogy. Nagel observed that a well-ordered society, as described by Rawls, was not neutral among conceptions of the good, since it might be a society in which some conceptions flourished and others did not. Rawls replied that while the theory was not neutral among conceptions, it was nonetheless fair to persons, viewed as free. For any given conception, it ensured that no person had (unfairly) greater opportunity to pursue successfully that conception than any other person—even if it did not ensure that each person would have the same opportunity to pursue successfully some conceptions as that person would have to pursue another conception.

Second, the interest that underlies some liberties is an interest in what exercise of those liberties guided by the agent’s attitudes constitutes or secures. Suppose that, with respect to such a liberty, one has less opportunity to exercise it guided by the attitudes that one in fact has than others have to exercise that liberty guided by the different attitudes that they in fact have. For example, with respect to freedom of movement, Wander may have less opportunity to exercise it guided by his desire to go greater distances than Homebody has to exercise it guided by his desire to go shorter distances. In such a case, Wander might protest that Wander’s interest in the

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liberty is not as well satisfied as Homebody’s interest in the liberty. But this protest doesn’t get off the ground where social equality is concerned. For the interest in social equality is not an interest in something that political influence guided by certain attitudes constitutes or secures. It would be satisfied equally well by one’s having no influence at all—so long as no one else had any influence either. It is an interest simply in the relations that one has to others insofar as one shares equal influence with them.

Are we to conclude, then, that, as far as social equality is concerned, anything that gives equal a priori chances of decisiveness will do? Almost, but there is perhaps one further constraint. To illustrate, suppose that the ostensible system is majority rule. While X wins on the first ballot, the X-supporters would have implemented the X decision anyway, even if X had lost. In such a case, one wants to say, the X-supporters weren’t following majority rule, but instead the rule of imposing their own judgments or choices. This is decidedly not a rule that gives equal a priori chances. But now consider another case. The X-supporters foresee that in the future, X will start to lose out under majority rule, but not under plurality rule. (This is because X will defeat a divided opposition in the first round, whereas the opposition would unite to defeat X in a run-off.) So, they use their present majority to switch to plurality rule. Here too, one wants to say, the X-supporters were following not majority rule, but instead the rule: In each given case, follow that equal a priori chances rule which is most likely to ratify my own judgment or choice in that case. While this is a rule that gives equal a priori chances, it is hard to

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41 Still, “Political Equality and Election Systems,” p. 382, and Christiano, Rule of the Many (Westview Press, 1996), p. 234 suggest that political equality also requires “anonymity”: roughly, that any two profiles of votes that differ only in the identities of the voters deliver the same outcome. This is a significant constraint; it rules out district systems. However, it is hard to understand what the concern about non-anonymity could be, if not a concern about inequality in actual decisiveness, which we have already addressed.
see how a rule with a rider that makes specific reference to ratifying one’s own judgment or choice can be compatible with social equality, with a willingness to cede to everyone else the same degree of influence over political decisions that one enjoys. This suggests that merely following an equal a priori chances rule may not be enough for social equality. The rule followed must also be suitably impartial, free of any self-referential rider.

Even so, social equality, taken on its own, would require very little of formal procedures. Even unanimity requirements to depart from the status quo decision are compatible with it. The choice among such systems will rest on other, principally substantive, considerations. Perhaps proportional systems give greater voice to the interests of dispersed minorities that would otherwise be submerged, or make the representative body an image in miniature of the electorate as a whole—leading to substantively better decisions. Or perhaps district systems give greater voice to distinctive regional interests that would otherwise be submerged, or facilitate communication between constituents and representatives, or lead to more stable governments—leading to substantively better decisions. And within district systems, drawing boundaries so as to give greater voice to otherwise submerged groups may also lead to substantively better decisions. Presumably, the concern for substantive reliability will sometimes favor and sometimes oppose neutrality, depending on the kinds of decisions being made. For certain questions of policy, interests in stability and resistance to passing temptations may argue for supermajorities (as with, say, constitutional amendments), or special conditions may make consociational structures particularly desirable. On other questions of policy, simple majorities may tend to produce better results, by making representatives more responsive and accountable. All of this is compatible with equal a priori chances of decisiveness.
12. Which Democracy? Persistent Minorities

One might object that this permissiveness is unacceptably complacent about “persistent minorities”: more or less stable groups whose members are consistently outvoted. Why, though, are persistent minorities cause for concern?

One cause for concern is obvious and, in the real world, of the utmost seriousness. The existence of persistent minorities may be expected to lead to outcomes that are substantively bad, and bad, in particular, because they disadvantage members of those minorities. When it is said that under polarization, “minority group interests” are not “represented,” the root concern is often just that outcomes will tend treat members of those groups—the people with those interests—badly in substantive terms.  

This may be a compelling reason to alter our electoral system, within the wide latitude permitted by equal a priori chances, in ways that can be expected to produce substantively better outcomes. Take Lani Guinier’s example of an “at large” vote on which songs will be played at the high school prom, which has the predictable effect that every song will be, say, “classic rock” and no song will be “urban contemporary.” In this case, a “proportional party list” system would produce a better substantive outcome—a fairer distribution of musical enjoyment between classic rock and urban contemporary listeners—than “winner-take-all.”

However, suppose—departing, in a diagnostic spirit, from the real world—that the outcomes are substantively correct: members of the minority are in fact treated fairly, at least with respect to their substantive interests. Is there still some objection?

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42 Compare Beitz, Political Equality, Ch. 7.
43 The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: Free Press, 1994), 2–3. At p. 14, however, she seems to deny that the problem is simply that the resulting distribution of musical enjoyment is unfair.
It may be objected that members of the minority do not enjoy what in section 7 we called “correspondence”: a match between their choices or judgments and the decisions reached. But, first, as I discuss in Part I, it is obscure whether people have interests in correspondence. While of course it matters whether a political decision treats people well in substantive terms, it’s less clear why it should matter whether they think it treats them (or anyone else) well, independently of whether it does. And, second, although one way for someone’s interest in correspondence to be fulfilled is for others to implement the decision that matches his attitudes, there is another way: namely, for him to revise his attitudes to match the decision that will be implemented. Accordingly, a question arises about who bears what responsibility for ensuring that a given person’s interest in correspondence is satisfied. Suppose the members of the majority, whose views, we are imagining, are substantively correct, have taken great pains to explain to the minority why the substantively best decision is in fact substantively best, putting the minority in a position to satisfy their correspondence interests simply by following the arguments where they lead. However, the minority refuses to concede the point. Why isn’t the fact that their correspondence interests go unsatisfied, even if regrettable, their responsibility? Why at that point should they continue to have a claim on others to implement a substantively inferior decision to satisfy it?

It is often said that members of persistent minorities don’t enjoy equal influence.44 But insofar as they have equal a priori chances, they have equal contributory influence. And, as we saw in section 11, they will almost always have equal actual decisiveness, because almost no one, including any member of the majority, is ever decisive. It is common to dramatize the

special complaint of members of persistent minorities by saying that their vote made no
difference: that the outcome would have been the same no matter what they had done. But
members of persistent *majorities* can almost always make the same complaint: that the outcome
would have been the same no matter what they had done.

Two grounds for special complaint may remain, however. First, it remains the case that
the majority *as a group* enjoys decisiveness—indeed, insofar as the polarization persists,
control—whereas the minority *as a group* does not. And, in fairness, this is often how the point
is put. Perhaps, in addition to caring that I not be subordinated as an individual to another
individual with whom I have a claim of equality, I also care that the group to which I belong not
be subordinated to another group, with which it has a claim of equality. To illustrate, suppose
that the United States were to annex Iraq as the fifty-first state. Assuming that every member of
the first fifty states stood as an equal with every other, it would seem that every member of the
now fifty-one states stands as an equal with every other. Nevertheless, it would hardly seem
unreasonable for Iraqis to object that a “relevant” *group* to which they belong had been
subordinated to another *group*, the first fifty. Similarly, the members of the persistent minority
might have reason to object that, whether or not the majority is substantively reliable, their group
is subordinated to the majority, in virtue of the majority’s control over political decisions.\(^\text{45}\)

The challenge, if we appeal to vicarious, group subordination, is to specify the “relevant”
groups. Why should any given member of the minority be counted as a member of the minority,
rather than as a member of the electorate as a whole, or, indeed, of any number of other
intermediate groups, such as the majority plus that individual? In our hypothetical case, the
answer cannot be that members of the minority are presently treated unfairly in substantive

\(^\text{45}\) I am indebted to Annie Stilz for discussion of these issues.
terms, in comparison to members of the majority. For we have assumed that members are not treated unfairly in substantive terms. However, the divide between majority and minority may still track a divide between salient ethnic, racial, or religious groups, between which there has been a history of oppression, hostility, or mere separation, even if presently there is no substantively unfair treatment. It is certainly intuitive that such distinctions might plausibly make the majority and minority—the first fifty versus Iraq, polarized white voters versus black voters—“relevant” groups. But I don’t propose a theory of “relevant” groups here. The present point is simply that nothing in the view that I have been presenting rules out that there may be this distinct concern about vicarious, group subordination.

The other possible complaint is not against the presence of a persistent minority as such. It is instead against the manipulation of formal procedures that often attends a persistent minority: where voting rules are changed, or districts are gerrymandered, to favor a specific person, group, or party. Take Guinier’s example in which a board responded to the election of a member from an ethnic minority by replacing a requirement for certain motions from a single member’s say to two members’ say, effectively depriving the new board member of the power to make such motions.46 And racial or partisan gerrymandering of districts, albeit within equal population constraints, seems structurally equivalent. In such cases, the rule being followed is to select whatever equal chances rule is most likely to ratify the choices or judgment of one’s own group. And such self-referential riders are, as we noted earlier, at odds with social equality: with a willingness to concede to others as much influence as one enjoys over common affairs. If this is the residual, “procedural” objection to persistent minorities, then our account already accommodates it.

46 Tyranny of the Majority, p. 75. Indeed, much of Guinier’s concern seems to be with “switching” (p. 7) or “rigging” (p. 8) the process to favor a particular group.
13. Which Democracy? Equally Populated Districts?

In most respects, as we have seen, the concern about equal a priori chances is apt to be that it is too permissive. In one respect, however, equal a priori chances may seem too restrictive, and, moreover, in a way that is not required by social equality, if required at all. For under a district system, equal a priori chances requires that a district’s representation be proportional to its population. The U.S. Senate, for example, apportions two senators to each state, regardless of population. Whatever complaints one may have against this structure of representation, it might be objected, this structure does not, intuitively, constitute the social subordination of Californians to Rhode Islanders.47

A confounding factor, however, may drive this intuition. When two unequally populated groups reach joint decisions, giving equal influence to each group threatens social subordination (that is, the social subordination of any given member of the more populous group to any given member of the less populous group) less to the extent that the groups approximate independent, sovereign states (as opposed to groups within a single, sovereign state). One explanation for this may simply be that there is not same density of social relations across members of different sovereign states. Another explanation may be the countervailing force of the vicarious concern, discussed in the previous section, about the subordination of one’s group to other “relevant” groups, with which it has a claim of equality. Intuitively, although again I don’t propose a theory of this here, a sovereign state has some claim to equality with other sovereign states, regardless of population. And sovereign states do seem like “relevant” groups: that is, natural foci of this vicarious concern. There is palpable tension in the apology, “Yes, of course, I view your state,

47 Moreover, it is implausible to view this apportionment as a remedial measure, like those acknowledged in section 7, where social equality calls for giving greater influence to those whose standing as social equals is elsewhere under threat.
Mexico, as subordinate to mine, the U.S., but take no offense! I don’t view you as subordinate to me.”

Whatever explains it, this confounding factor means that the more closely the relevant “districts” approximate independent, sovereign states, the less threatening to social equality it will be to accord those “districts” equal influence over joint decisions. Thus, the one-nation, one-vote structure of the U.N. General Assembly seems less inappropriate, than, say, “malapportioned” congressional districts in Alabama or Tennessee before the judicial “reapportionment revolution” of the 1960s, which districts had no history as independent, sovereign states. And the latter, in turn, seem less inappropriate than a system that explicitly gave a non-territorial professional “bloc” and (a vastly more numerous) nonprofessional “bloc” equal representation.

The U.S. Senate, then, is apt to seem an intermediate case, largely because it was established at a time when the former colonies were, more or less, independent, sovereign polities. This history is responsible for the vexed, “federal” character of the U.S. Constitution: a compromise, contested at times by war, between a union of sovereign states and a union of citizens under a national government. To the extent that the “federal” model correctly applies to the United States—to the extent that it is closer to the General Assembly than to Alabama congressional districts in the 1950s—some form of equal representation of states would be natural. To be sure, I don’t mean to defend “federalism.” On the contrary, it seems to me an irredeemably anachronistic doctrine, which enjoys only selective and opportunistic advocacy. The point is simply that, in light of the influence that federalism still exercises over our political self-conception, we should not expect to find in the U.S. Senate particularly clear or telling
counterexamples. The same, I suspect, goes for similar, “federal” structures in other national legislatures.


When a constitutional court strikes down a statute as unconstitutional, is this necessarily a violation of social equality? Imagine, as a stylized case, that we have inherited a constitution that assigns review powers to a constitutional court, whose justices are appointed by elected representatives for life terms. Decisions of the court can be, in effect, overruled by amending the constitution, but that requires a two-thirds majority in a referendum.

It might be said that this system of judicial review thwarts the will of the majority, by, in effect, imposing a supermajority requirement on the passage of the statute. This may be a perfectly valid objection on grounds of substantive reliability. (Indeed, it is an objection to which I am quite sympathetic.) But it is not a valid objection on grounds of social equality, if, as we have argued, social equality is as content with supermajoritarian requirements as with majoritarian ones.

Alternatively, it might be said that because of the powers the justices wield—namely, whether or not supermajority requirements will be imposed on certain forms of legislation—they must meet especially stringent conditions to be delegates of those powers. They must be directly elected, or hold office only temporarily. This claim is hard to evaluate in advance of a more developed theory of delegation. But, as we saw, there is reason to expect that delegates who issue final commands—who make new law—will have to meet more stringent conditions than those who merely apply the law that already exists. And the justices, at least as we are conceiving them here, have the power to do something closer to the latter than to the former.

If social equality demands deflatingly little of formal procedures, it demands a great deal, perhaps impossibly much, of informal conditions. Informal opportunity consists roughly the availability of resources, such as wealth and leisure, to apply to the legal or procedural structure to acquire information or influence the votes of others. As far as social equality is concerned, inequalities of influence over political decisions resulting from informal conditions are (at least in the first instance) no less threatening than inequalities of influence over political decisions built into formal procedures. By contrast, an expressive approach, which held that equality of influence over political decisions matters only as a way of avoiding an insult to those with less influence, might give us little reason to be concerned about inequalities of informal influence.

For informal inequalities are not directly established or endorsed by the state’s public pronouncements, and they are largely hidden from view.\(^{48}\)

As we noted earlier, social equality requires equal opportunity to knowingly influence political decisions in line with one’s judgments. Hence, unequal access to information about how to influence political decisions in line with one’s judgments is itself a form of unequal opportunity for influence.\(^{49}\) Similarly, as far as social equality is concerned, there is no reason to discount opportunity for indirect influence: the availability of resources, such as wealth and leisure, to influence the votes of others or the decisions of representatives. Having the means to

\(^{48}\) However, even on the view I am arguing for, formal inequalities can be expected to be more objectionable, in the second instance as it were, than informal inequalities. For the formal inequalities are more likely to compound objectionable relations of social inferiority with objectionable public expressions of endorsement of, or at least indifference about, such relations.

persuade others seems as much an opportunity to influence a decision as being able to cast a ballot oneself.

How could we ensure equality of such informal opportunity for influence? One answer, again, would be a lottery. For example, the system might give each person a vote, with the decision being made by a lottery giving equal weight to each (sufficiently) distinct option that received at least one vote. Here money spent convincing others to vote for one’s preferred option would not bring any advantage over simply casting a vote for it oneself.

Let us assume, however, the loss of other goods, such as substantive reliability (or the costs to social equality along other dimensions), that would result from a lottery would be too much to bear. Then measures must be taken to assure equality of informal opportunity for influence compatible with positive influence. Achieving equality of access to relevant information, as many theorists have suggested, presents daunting practical challenges. The very division of labor seems to militate against it. In any moderately complex society, some will be paid to acquire relevant political information, whereas others will have to acquire it, if they acquire it at all, in their spare time. Likewise, achieving equality of access to the levers of indirect influence, presumably through subsidies (“floors”) or limits (“ceilings”) on campaign finance and expenditure, also presents serious practical challenges. However, these practical challenges are perhaps not much more serious than the already formidable practical challenges of achieving a just distribution of wealth in general.

Although it would be a mistake to minimize these practical challenges, there are limits to what philosophy (at least of the kind being pursued in this paper) can say about them. However, there is a more immediate theoretical objection to the idea of equal opportunity for indirect

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influence, which philosophy ought to be able to address. Intuitively, it matters what form indirect influence takes. Granted, it may be objectionable if Expert has more opportunity than Crank to make his case to Hearer, because of factors that do not depend on Hearer’s autonomous judgment (in the sense of section 7): his free reflection on what he takes to be relevant reasons. For example, it may be objectionable that Expert, but not Crank, has access to a printing press.\footnote{Some such forms of indirect influence may be inappropriate even if access to them is equally distributed. As Geoff Brennan pointed out to me, buying votes seems inappropriate, somehow outside “the rules of the game,” even when we stipulate that equality isn’t an issue. (His example was the election of the pope, but Mill’s plural voting scheme might be more to the point.) There may be a sufficient objection to reject a market in votes before we even reach a concern for social equality (as Debra Satz, \textit{Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets} (Oxford: 2010), at p. 102, observes). In any event, we are considering disparities of opportunities for indirect influence of a kind that is surely appropriate, within the “rules of the game,” such as presenting others with arguments that one sincerely believes tell in favor of their voting in a certain way.} But it hardly seems objectionable that Expert has a greater capacity to affect Hearer’s vote simply because Hearer will, upon free reflection, take the considerations that Expert offers to be better reasons. The \textit{Difference Intuition}, to give it a name, is that while “judgment-independent” inequalities in opportunity for informal influence may be problematic, “judgment-dependent” inequalities—which merely result from the influenced person exercising his judgment—certainly are not. But, the objection runs, an account like ours, which requires equality of opportunity for influence as such, can’t draw this distinction and so cannot account for the Difference Intuition.\footnote{See Dworkin, \textit{Sovereign Virtue}, p. 195.}

One might at first be tempted by a theory of error for the Difference Intuition. It is not that judgment-dependent inequalities are less objectionable, but instead that \textit{measures to eliminate} them are more objectionable: incompatible, for example, with freedom of expression. But this seems to me misguided. The tension with freedom of expression is less severe if the measures take the form of subsidies, or simply moral encouragement (e.g., not to allow oneself...
to be influenced by opinions that one finds convincing), rather than restrictions. Still, such moral encouragement seems misplaced. The Difference Intuition ought to be taken at face value. However, I believe that our account can explain the Difference Intuition—or rather it gets the explanation for free, since this distinction is built into the very idea of equality of opportunity. It is part of how we understand equality of opportunity for religious practice, for example, that it is upset by judgment-independent factors, but not by judgment-dependent factors, such as others’ not sharing your faith. Recall the Compossibility Principle, which says that equal opportunity for X-ing should be understood in such a way that whether it obtains among individuals does not depend on how one of those individuals exercises the opportunity to X. If my exercise of an opportunity to X deprives you of your opportunity to X, then that only shows we never enjoyed equal opportunity to X to begin with. (Perhaps we only enjoyed equal opportunity to beat the other guy to X-ing.) This means, for example, that “opportunity to pursue one’s religious convictions” must not be understood in such a way that, simply because there are not enough people around who are persuaded by my faith, which leaves me without the quorum that my faith requires for its rites, I do not enjoy equal opportunity with others to pursue my religious convictions. For my inability to muster that quorum results from what surely counts as others’ exercise of their opportunity to pursue their religious convictions: their refusal to be persuaded by my faith. The very idea of equality of opportunity to pursue one’s religious convictions, therefore, seems to require us to distinguish between inequalities that result simply from others’ pursuing their own convictions—from their exercising their like opportunity—and inequalities that have independent sources, such as political persecution, or an unjust distribution of leisure.

See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, pp. 197–8.
Similarly—returning to the case of political influence—Crank cannot claim that, simply because Hearer makes up his mind to disregard Crank’s reasons, Crank has been deprived of equal opportunity for influence. For the alleged deprivation of Crank’s equal opportunity results simply from Hearer’s exercising the opportunity to do what surely counts as his (Hearer’s) exercise of his like opportunity: namely, opportunity to influence the decision on the basis of his autonomous judgment, on the basis of what he, on free reflection, takes to be relevant reasons. And if Hearer’s disregarding Crank’s reasons in this way does not deprive Crank of equal opportunity, then there is no reason to seek to prevent such a deprivation by silencing Expert. In sum, the very idea of equality of opportunity requires us to distinguish between judgment-dependent and judgment-independent inequalities, and to see the latter, but not the former, as compromising that equality of opportunity. There is no special embarrassment for the idea of equal opportunity for political influence here, just a distinction of a kind that attaches to any species of equality of opportunity.

Moreover, denying that equality of informal opportunity for influence matters in itself has costs of its own. While it would relieve us of the burden of explaining why judgment-dependent inequalities are not objectionable, it would, at the same time, deprive us of an explanation of why judgment-independent inequalities are objectionable. And, if we agree that such inequalities are objectionable, it is not clear what the alternative explanation is to be. It might be said that we care about inequalities in informal opportunity for influence only insofar as they tend to produce substantively bad outcomes, which judgment-independent inequalities are more likely to produce. But the complaint about inequalities in informal opportunity is not, I think, merely pending a convincing showing that the wealthier are better informed, or that what

is good for General Motors is good for the country. Or it might be said that we care about informal inequalities in opportunities for influence only insofar as they involve the expenditure of independently unjust shares of wealth, which judgment-independent inequalities are more likely to involve. But using an unjust share of wealth to buy an expensive car is not nearly as troubling as using it to buy a Senate seat, with all that that implies for one’s influence over the lives of others. Instead, I suspect, the core of the concern about the effect of disparities of wealth on our politics is a concern about a few wielding inordinate power with respect to the many, in a way that seems simply incompatible with a society of equals, a society in which none rules over any other.